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BOB SHELDON: This is a MORS Oral
History Interview with Al Lieberman, FS.
Al has worked in a range of analytic and
research activities for various agencies of
the Federal government for over 40 years.
He is currently a senior researcher for the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Since 1992, Al has been a Fellow of the
Military Operations Research Society. This
is the 24th of July 2003, and we’re here at
the State Department Annex overlooking
the Potomac River and the Kennedy Cen-
ter. Let me get started—where were you
born and raised?
AL LIEBERMAN: I was born in Frank-
furt am Main, Germany, 30 March 1926. We
lived there until I was the age of six,
roughly. In late 1932 or early ’33, we left
Frankfurt am Main and went to Belgium,
into France and then I lived in Paris from
1933 to 1940.
BOB SHELDON: Do you have recol-
lections of living in Frankfurt?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes, I have some
recollections. I went to public school for a
year or so. And I do remember when the
Nazi Party started because they used to
have parades. Kids usually go and watch
parades; however when the Nazis paraded,
nobody watched. Everybody rushed home
because invariably there were great big
fights with the Communists. There were a
lot of Communists in Germany at that time.
Invariably somebody would end up beat
up or dead. I also remember walking by
buildings where furniture had been thrown
out the window because they were throw-
ing someone out of their apartment; mostly
it was Jews, but also the Communists.
Before the Nazi takeover, life in Ger-
many was really great. I mean, when I was
three, four and five years old, we had a
very good life and happy times. My father,
in partnership with my uncle, owned the
largest wholesale egg dealership in Frank-
furt and he made a good living. We had a
very nice apartment and it was a good life
until the Nazis came to power. I remember
the school I went to; it was a Jewish school,
and of course the Nazis closed it.
BOB SHELDON: Did your father
travel around the rural parts of Germany
working with the farmers to get the eggs?
AL LIEBERMAN: No, he was in a
wholesale business. He bought the eggs
from various farms and then they packaged
them in the shop, and then they delivered
them to the local groceries around Frank-
furt. He had a deliveryman, a young man
who would drive a vehicle that was like a
motorized tricycle with a very large carrier
in front, and they would put the egg crates
in the front of that vehicle and he would
deliver all them to the customers. I remem-
ber this young fellow because I got to know
him. He joined the Nazi Party like many
others in Germany at the time. When things
got bad, my father sent my sister and me
and my mother to Saarbrucken; this was
the home of my maternal grandparents. My
father and uncle stayed in Frankfurt a little
longer. Then one day they told this young
fellow, the delivery boy, that they wouldn’t
be in for a week or so, but he should con-
tinue running the store while they were
gone. They then left and joined us in Saar-
brucken, but they didn’t want to tell any-
body that they would not return. My father
owned an apartment with furniture and all
that, and they just left.
BOB SHELDON: Left it all behind?
AL LIEBERMAN: Left it all behind.
Then they went to Saarbrucken to pick us
up and we all left Saarbrucken and went to
Belgium and for a time we stayed in Blan-
kenbergen, a beach resort in Belgium.
BOB SHELDON: Saarbrucken was in
between Germany and France?
AL LIEBERMAN: Right. And after
World War I, [it] became independent of
both Germany and France. It was in be-
tween the two. In 1935, I believe—we were
in France at the time—they had a referen-
dum to vote whether they wanted to go to
Germany, to France, or stay independent.
At that time, my mother went back, be-
cause she was born in Saarbrucken, to vote
for continuing independence. But the Nazis
had so infiltrated the Saar that the vote was
to join Germany. So that was the end of the
independence of Saarbrucken. But at the
time we escaped, it was still an indepen-
dent country.
BOB SHELDON: Did many of your
friends or neighbors leave Germany about
the same time you did?
AL LIEBERMAN: No, not many. Some
left but many of them stayed on because
they believed that the Nazi party was a
passing trend. My father and my uncle had
foresight and they saw the handwriting on
the wall. A number of my other relatives
also left at that time.
BOB SHELDON: Did your grandpar-
ents leave Saarbrucken at that time too?
AL LIEBERMAN: No, they did not.
They left a little later after my grandfather
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had died. My grandmother went with an aunt
and uncle and they moved to Copenhagen,
Denmark, and the Danes treated them very
well. I don’t know if you recall but all of the
Danish Jews were taken out one day by ship by
the Danes, taken across to Sweden, and they
spent the rest of the war in Sweden. Most of the
Danish Jews were saved that way. And my
grandmother was among them as well as my
uncle, aunt and cousins.
BOB SHELDON: Was your family ever
able to go back to Germany and recover any of
your effects?
AL LIEBERMAN: My mother and father
never went back to Germany. But yes, some
recovery was made because after the war, the
Germans had something called restitution and
my father put in a claim for himself and me, as
well. He received a pension from the German
government to cover the loss of the apartment
and the loss of the business. I got some money
because they ruled that I had lost a year of
schooling and therefore I was entitled to com-
pensation. I recall that my father had me fill out
these forms. I mailed them off and about two
years later, I got a call from the Bank of Be-
thesda: “Can you come here? We have a check
from the German government for you.” So I did
get something and he got a pension. He got that
pension up until the day he died.
BOB SHELDON: Have you ever gone back
to visit your family’s neighborhood in Frank-
furt or in Saarbrucken?
AL LIEBERMAN: No. I have been back to
Frankfurt once on a business trip. I have also
had business meetings in various other parts of
Germany. The City of Frankfurt passed a law
where they would invite all the people that
were chased out by the Nazis, to spend two
weeks in Frankfurt at their expense. And they
would fly you over and put you up in a hotel.
I was invited twice and I couldn’t make it either
time. But my sister who lives in San Francisco
accepted this year and she did go to Frankfurt.
She said it was a great trip. They took her out
and showed her all of Frankfurt, took her back
to her old neighborhood. They are making a
real effort to show us the best side of Germany.
BOB SHELDON: Now we have you in
Belgium; how long did you stay there?
AL LIEBERMAN: Six months. Six months
in Belgium.
BOB SHELDON: Who were you staying
with?
AL LIEBERMAN: We stayed in hotels. We
were able to do this because my father had
some money. Then from Belgium we moved to
Paris. In Paris my father went into the dry
goods business; he had a dry goods store for a
while. Later he became a stockbroker and even-
tually that’s what he did, worked for a broker-
age house as a stockbroker. I went to public
school and then to high school in Paris. There
was an event that—when the war started—
when France entered the war with Germany, I
was called to the Principal’s office at the high
school, “You were born in Frankfurt, Germany
and we’re not going to have any Germans in
our school while we’re at war, so go home,
good-bye.” Well fortunately, I got home and
my mother explained that we were Polish citi-
zens because my father was born in Austria-
Hungary, which after World War I became Po-
land, and we became Polish citizens. So even
though I was born in Frankfurt, I was on his
passport as a Polish citizen. So my mother took
me back to school and said, “Wait a minute,
we’re Polish citizens and France is at war be-
cause of the German invasion of Poland. The
Poles are our allies, how come you’re throwing
Poles out of school?” They said, “He can come
right back to school.” But one of my uncles had
a different story. He was born in Germany.
Since he was a German, the French put him in
a detention camp. Of all the Germans in the
camp, ninety-five percent of them were Jews.
But it was one of the things they did.
BOB SHELDON: I never read about that
before.
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes. A lot of people do
dumb things at times. I think they were still
worried about a German Fifth column; some-
thing like that occurred during World War I. So
anyway, I lived in Paris. I went to public school
and high school, took two years of high school,
until 1940. Around late May 1940, just before
the Germans were approaching Paris, we took a
train to southern France. The train was
crowded with wounded soldiers and other peo-
ple trying to get away. We went to Biarritz, a
beach resort south of Bordeaux, not far from the
Spanish border. We stayed there for several
months. France was divided into two parts; one
run by the Vichy Government and the other
occupied by the Germans. The Germans sent
their troops down on the coast; all the way
down to the Spanish border. They took a thin
slice of land on the coastline.
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So we left again. My father hired a guy with
a truck and we all rode in the back of the truck
and went to the Spanish border. There a train
took us across Spain into Portugal. When we
arrived at the Spanish border, the Germans
were already there. Advanced motorcycle
troops were already there, but they didn’t pay
much attention to us. At the border, the French
had inspectors. There were a number of things
that we were not permitted to take out of
France. Some of my relatives that were with us
had jewelry and cash, and some were afraid to
go across so they didn’t go. One of my uncles
that did not come with us eventually died in a
concentration camp. But some of us went
across. I remember seeing people handing the
French border guards piles of money to not
look at certain bags.
In Spain, we were not allowed to leave the
train. The train traveled through Spain to Por-
tugal. Every time we got to a station where they
had soldiers, Spanish soldiers outside, nobody
could leave the train. We could get off at the
stations to buy something to drink, but got
right back on the train. At that time I was
fourteen. I got off at one station and bought
something and the train started moving, and I
couldn’t get back to the car I was in. I ran like
hell and I got to another car, but I couldn’t go
from one car to the next one. Well, you can
imagine how my parents were reacting to that;
they did not know that I got on another car. I
was in the other car, and when we stopped at
the next station, I was able to run up and get
back in the car with my parents. That was quite
an adventure because if they lost me there, God
knows what would have happened.
So we got to Portugal and the Portuguese
sent all of us to a place called Curia. Curia is a
small resort town. It is known for its well water;
people vacation there and drink the waters. It is
a very nice place in the country. We were kind
of interned there, but in a golden manner, re-
stricted to stay in a fancy hotel in Curia. There
were several hotels in this resort. We stayed in
a hotel called the Grand Hotel because the peo-
ple who ran the hotel spoke German. We didn’t
speak Portuguese, and they didn’t speak
French, so they spoke German, and that
worked for us. I think we stayed there for four
or five months.
BOB SHELDON: Did you learn French
while you were in Paris?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes. I learned French
while I was in Paris.
BOB SHELDON: But you weren’t in Por-
tugal long enough to learn Portuguese?
AL LIEBERMAN: No, I learned some
words but not enough to understand. We
wanted to get out of Portugal, because every-
body was afraid the Germans would eventually
move into Spain and Portugal; nobody knew
what they were going to do next. Fortunately, it
turned out that in 1938, my father and my uncle
one day were walking in Paris and passed by
the American Embassy, and in the spirit of the
moment decided to drop in and apply for a
visa. They never thought that they would actu-
ally go, but they went in and applied. So by the
time we got to Portugal, we went to the Amer-
ican Consulate in Porto and I went with my
father because I was the only one that spoke
some English. I had two years of high school
English in Paris, so I was the translator. I went
because at the Embassy, they spoke Portuguese
and English, but not French or German. So we
came in and explained that we have been wait-
ing for two years, we’re on the list. They looked
it up and sure enough, we’re on a list and our
name came up. We were on a Polish quota;
there were quotas for each country. They asked
my father what he was going to do when he
came to America, and I had to tell them that we
would raise chickens on a farm. He was an
expert in eggs. Somehow my father thought a
chicken farm was what would be acceptable. So
with my two years of high school English, I
translated all of this and sure enough, we got
our entry visa to the United States. My father
had friends in New York and my mother had
an aunt who lived in New York; they vouched
for us.
BOB SHELDON: In Portugal, were there
concerns about Franco being the Dictator of
Spain and his relationship with the Germans?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes, there were some
concerns, however the main worry was that the
Germans would enter Spain and Portugal. A
dictator, Salazar, also ran Portugal, but he was
a benevolent dictator. Salazar was a Professor
of economics who became President of Portu-
gal. He was a dictator, but not like Franco and
certainly not like Hitler. Anyway, we got on the
list to come to the United States. We traveled on
a Portuguese ship that went from Lisbon to
New York.
BOB SHELDON: Was this in 1940 or forty-
one?
AL LIEBERMAN: This was in December
1940. We arrived in January of ’41. At that time,
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT. . .ALFRED LIEBERMAN, FS
Military Operations Research, V9 N1 2004 Page 59
there were a lot of U-boats around and there
was always this fear, but we were on a Portu-
guese ship and they were neutral. So we ar-
rived in New York. We arrived at Ellis Island
and my mother’s aunt who lived in the Bronx
got us an apartment, or rather we sub-leased
one and that got us started in the United States.
When I arrived I first went to a public middle
school. I could only speak a little English so I
spent two months in middle school, and then
once I started speaking the language, skipped
to the middle of high school.
BOB SHELDON: What did your dad do
for a living when you were in the Bronx?
AL LIEBERMAN: He became a stockbro-
ker and he did that the rest of his life. He tried
several businesses and they were moderately
successful. In 1944 I was drafted into the Army,
and I became a citizen while in basic training.
They sent me Camp Blanding in Florida for
basic training, and then I went to Fort Knox and
Camp Campbell.
BOB SHELDON: What was your skill area
in the Army?
AL LIEBERMAN: I became a tank mechan-
ic; they sent me to tank mechanic school. When
I first was drafted I was sent to infantry basic
training. When I got through with basic train-
ing, they sent me to the ASTP [Army Special-
ized Training Program]. I was sent to the Uni-
versity of Connecticut and I spent several
months there. Then they sent me to the Univer-
sity of Maine where they gave us engineering
courses. After I got finished with that training,
they sent me to Fort Knox to tank mechanic
school. This happened in a strange way. One
day in basic I was called in to the First Sergeant
who said, “You have the highest IQ in our
battalion, so you have a choice. Want to go to
cook’s school?” “Not really” “How about tank
mechanic school?” “Yes, I’ll take it, I’ll take it.”
So I went to tank mechanic school and I grad-
uated, I believe, second or third in the class. So
I did very well at tank mechanic school. How-
ever once it came to fixing a problem with a
tank, I really wasn’t very good at it. So that’s
what I remember from then. In 1946 I was
discharged from the Army.
I had started at the City College of New
York studying engineering. When I came back I
decided I didn’t want that. I decided to go into
statistics. Statistics was taught in the business
school at City College. So I took courses in
statistics and graduated with a degree.
BOB SHELDON: What motivated you to-
ward statistics?
AL LIEBERMAN: I like numbers, I play
with numbers, I’m good at numbers, you know.
Originally, I thought engineering but I lost my
interest.
BOB SHELDON: Any notable professors
that you remember?
AL LIEBERMAN: There was a professor of
statistics at the City College who really en-
hanced my interest. Then in 1950 I got married
and decided to move to California. My sister
and her husband had moved to California, so
my wife and I decided to go there. We got in an
old beat-up car and we drove to California. The
car died somewhere near Albuquerque out in
the desert; the car broke down. Fortunately a
couple of guys working in Los Alamos came
driving by and stopped, “What’s the problem?”
They were able to fix that engine and get us
started. So we got through and we eventually
did get to California; we moved to Los Angeles.
BOB SHELDON: So you couldn’t fix tanks
and you couldn’t fix cars.
AL LIEBERMAN: That’s right. In Los An-
geles, we lived there for about two years. I had
a number of jobs. I worked at the Bank of
America for a little while, but my main job was
with the Regional Planning Commission, which
conducted city and town planning, zoning and
things like that. I worked there for a couple of
years, and then we decided to move back East.
When I came back East, we couldn’t find an
apartment and I couldn’t find a job.
BOB SHELDON: Back in the Bronx again
or New York City?
AL LIEBERMAN: We came back to New
York, the Bronx; I couldn’t find anything in
New York. So I decided to come down to Wash-
ington. I found a job at Fort Detrick in Freder-
ick, Maryland. It was in biological warfare,
working for a contractor. I got a job there as a
statistician. At the time, I was the first statisti-
cian they hired to help with the analysis. When
I first came in, they didn’t have any special
office for me to work in, so I worked with the
bacteriologists and they were inside a “hot”
area where you had to take showers when you
came out.
BOB SHELDON: Is that near the big
“Eight Ball”? [According to Fort Detrick visi-
tor’s information, “. . . 40-foot-high stainless
steel sphere that everyone on base calls the
’Eight Ball’ . . . a one million liter test sphere
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built for aerobiological studies of agents highly
pathogenic to man and animals . . .”]
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes, by the Eight Ball,
right. I did a lot of work with the Eight Ball. So
it meant I had to shower twice a day, come out
for lunch and shower and in the evening,
shower. The most interesting story about this
occurred when a bachelor friend who worked
there had rented a room upstairs in somebody’s
house and the room came with a shower, but he
never took a shower because he was taking two
a day at work. But he was so worried about
what the people downstairs would think that
he let the shower run every morning for a while
even though he did not step into it. Eventually
they built offices outside the hot area and hired
a whole staff. I became the deputy of that shop
in charge of the design of experiments and
analysis, and the man in charge was Jay Leary,
who was an experienced statistician.
BOB SHELDON: How many statisticians
did you have there?
AL LIEBERMAN: Eventually we built up
to at least ten and then there were a lot of
people working on calculators. That was before
the age of big computers and we had a lot of
calculators; people who do analysis of vari-
ances. We did a lot of analysis of variance,
regression analysis, probit analysis, etc. In the
Eight Ball, we ran experiments where they
would either explode the munitions or dissem-
inate them by spray procedures. Then we
would pick up samples to see what portion of
the bacteria survived. We performed tests on
animals, monkeys and mice that would be ex-
posed through holes in the Eight Ball.
BOB SHELDON: Since a lot of our readers
probably have never even seen the Eight Ball,
can you describe it?
AL LIEBERMAN: The Eight Ball was a
huge sphere. By huge, I mean, I don’t remem-
ber exactly the size, but a couple of stories high.
It was enclosed and it permitted the control of
the humidity and temperature inside of this
sphere. There were holes on various sides
where they could stick monkeys’ heads in, or
mice. Then they would explode or disseminate
munitions in the middle of this ball. And then
we had petri dishes all around to pick up sam-
ples of what survived. Usually it was just a
small percentage because one of the things with
bacteria, a large portion would not survive the
explosion of the munitions. We would calculate
the proportion of the bacteria that would sur-
vive and the lethality of these doses. I think
anthrax was one of the main agents that were
being studied, there were some others, too. We
would run these experiments both with ani-
mals and with petri dishes, and calculate the
effectiveness of various combinations of muni-
tions.
BOB SHELDON: What kind of an explo-
sive did they use to set those off?
AL LIEBERMAN: I am not sure about the
type of munitions used. The test weapon was in
the middle of the Eight Ball where it was sus-
pended and blown up. These were munitions
that would be dropped from airplanes.
BOB SHELDON: What years was this?
AL LIEBERMAN: We’re talking the 50’s. I
worked there from October ’52 to October ’55.
BOB SHELDON: What kind of experimen-
tal designs did you use?
AL LIEBERMAN: Latin squares and frac-
tional factorials were the ones used more than
anything else.
BOB SHELDON: How many variables
would you typically play around with in your
experiments?
AL LIEBERMAN: It was quite a few, for
example, the size of the dose, the humidity and
temperature. I’d say there were four or five
variables. And we did mostly the analysis of
variance and regressions in order to determine
the critical variables and their interactions. We
also did probit analysis to find the LD50 and
compared the dose sizes required for various
agents.
BOB SHELDON: What is LD50?
AL LIEBERMAN: Lethal dose fifty. That is
where fifty percent of the animals would die.
BOB SHELDON: That’s similar to circular
error probable (CEP) where fifty percent of the
kills are within a given radius.
AL LIEBERMAN: This is the dose that kills
fifty percent of the animals.
BOB SHELDON: Did they have a compar-
ative approach to determine what the dose was
for an animal compared to a human?
AL LIEBERMAN: There was work on that,
but I never worked on it.
BOB SHELDON: Did you try to emulate
foreign weapon systems or were you trying to
emulate U.S. weapon systems?
AL LIEBERMAN: Just U.S. weapons as far
as I knew.
BOB SHELDON: What was the level of
security classification of your experiments?
AL LIEBERMAN: Secret. I am sure that
there was some work at higher security levels
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but I worked mostly at the Secret level. We also
got a lot of shots. I don’t know what all the
shots were for. I’m not certain that they didn’t
conduct experiments on us, but I don’t know
for sure.
BOB SHELDON: Was your statistical
training at CCNY adequate for the statistics you
were using or did you take some more ad-
vanced courses?
AL LIEBERMAN: I went to the University
of Southern California. They didn’t have a sta-
tistics department, but they had an economics
department and statistics was taught in the eco-
nomics department. So I took some courses
there. Then I went back to school when I was
working in Frederick. Two or three times a
week I drove to Washington and went to night
school. I went first to George Washington then
to American University, and I took all ad-
vanced courses in mathematical statistics. One
of my teachers was Professor Sam Greenhouse.
There were several others that were really
good.
BOB SHELDON: We have software now-
adays that does all these statistical tests. How
were you doing it then?
AL LIEBERMAN: We didn’t have a com-
puter. Everything was done by a bunch of peo-
ple working on Frieden and Marchant calcula-
tors and we did it step by step. I also remember
we had a sorting process, we used something
called McBee cards [also called Hollerith (or
IBM) punch cards]—there were big cards and
the top of the cards had holes in them and then
you punched out a hole. So if you were search-
ing for some document with some combination
of key words, you would put these needles in
these holes and you’d shake and out would
drop the one that you searched for. It was a
manual computer. And then we did many ex-
periments and we’d write up reports on each of
these experiments and send them out to the
chain of command.
BOB SHELDON: The chain of command,
do you know where they went?
AL LIEBERMAN: I think they mostly
stayed at Detrick; it was part of the continuous
research going on biological warfare. But I do
remember this story. We had no air condition-
ing and it was hot. In the summertime when it
would reach a certain heat and humidity level,
we were sent home. Well, we were in this
building up on the second floor and on the floor
below us were the monkeys. They had air con-
ditioning because the monkeys couldn’t sur-
vive without the air conditioning. So one day
we made a request to use the backup air con-
ditioner that they had for the monkeys. Our
request was turned down.
BOB SHELDON: The monkeys were more
important than you were?
AL LIEBERMAN: The monkeys were more
important, that’s right. It was so hot one day, I
remember, we had this elderly lady and in
every hallway there was a shower in case of a
biological accident, you could wash yourself.
But it was so hot one day; she was fully dressed
and pulled that shower.
BOB SHELDON: Did you study any biol-
ogy of the process while you were there?
AL LIEBERMAN: I learned a little bit, just
what I could learn from talking to the biolo-
gists. It wasn’t really important for us because
we were looking at A versus B, and we didn’t
really care what it was. We didn’t have to know
that much about it. We did have to learn how to
design and analyze experiments. Our boss, Jay
Leary, had six large notebooks; I mean thou-
sands of pages. They not only contained copies
of parts of various books, but articles from sta-
tistical journals, anything of pertinence to the
job, he would copy. He gave each of us some of
these homemade books and he kept up with the
literature all the time. So for the three years I
was there, I really kept up with every article
that was published dealing with the kind of
work we were doing. Then in 1955, the Parson
Company that I was working for at the time lost
this contract. They had sent two people from
their main office to set up this branch and those
two people quit, closed shop, good-bye. I was
fortunate enough that they held onto me for
seven or eight weeks, maybe ten weeks, before
I had to go. So I looked for work elsewhere, and
I got an offer from a company, AVCO. The
work was in Bridgeport, Connecticut. The work
involved reliability analysis of the TITAN mis-
sile system. Unfortunately my wife got sick
from the humidity in Bridgeport and we had to
leave.
I then got a job at the Bureau of Ships
working for Bessie Day. Bessie Day was in
charge of the statistical group of the Bureau of
Ships. She wanted me to work for her when I
left Detrick, but I took the job in Bridgeport. So
when my wife got sick, I went back and con-
tacted her and she said, “You’ve got a job.” So
I came and worked for the government. She put
me in charge of the experimental design divi-
sion of the group. I then started designing ex-
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periments on all kinds of projects for the Navy.
Most of the work was for the Underwater
Sound Laboratory in New London, Connecti-
cut. I set up a whole series of experiments on
submarine noises. I still remember one of these
experiments. I went out in a submarine and I
told the submarine commander, “Go down to a
hundred feet. Go down to three hundred and
come back up to hundred. Go down to four
hundred.” I had it all randomized. He said,
“Can’t we just do one hundred, then two, then
three?” “No, follow my plan.” He couldn’t fig-
ure out why I made him go up and down but
he did it. The idea was to test at various speeds,
at various depths, the sound of the submarine.
We would turn off various pieces of equipment
in order to determine where the noises were
originating. The purpose was to make the sub-
marine as silent as possible. I ran these experi-
ments and we analyzed the results, and then
reported them. The engineers at the lab would
then work on the equipment that created the
most noise in order to reduce the sound.
BOB SHELDON: Were the statistical de-
signs similar to the ones used at Fort Detrick?
AL LIEBERMAN: They were similar; they
were the same kind of design. Essentially we
were testing the depth of the submarine, the
speed of the submarine, which motors were
running on the submarine and what equipment
was turned off. There were no probit analyses
however.
BOB SHELDON: Did you do screening ex-
periments to narrow it down to a couple of
variables for more detailed experiments, or did
you usually quit after the first set of experi-
ments?
AL LIEBERMAN: No, we went on. We did
more and more until we found exactly where
the noise came from. Then when we found the
source of the noise, there were engineers over
there that would see how they could dampen
down that noise, do something about it and
make it as low as possible. But we did other
experiments too. I remember I did some work
for Admiral Rickover. I remember being sent
out to set up some experiment in Columbus,
Ohio. I don’t remember much of the details of
the experiment, but I do remember the event
because the Admiral insisted that when we
traveled for him, we’d leave that same day, not
the day before, and arrive to work at 8:00 A.M.
in the morning and return that same evening.
So we had to get up at an unearthly hour to
make that flight. But he said, “You’re not going
to waste money having to spend the night
somewhere.”
BOB SHELDON: Did you meet him per-
sonally?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes. He was quite a guy,
a very bright man.
BOB SHELDON: The Smithsonian Ameri-
can History museum recently had an exhibit on
submarines. They had headsets you could put
on and listen to what the acoustics sounded like
underwater. Did you actually listen to it your-
self or use acoustical measuring devices?
AL LIEBERMAN: We had a measuring de-
vice and I may have heard some of the record-
ings. I did mainly the experimental design anal-
ysis and then we had engineers that would do
the technical work.
BOB SHELDON: When you were doing
your measurements, did you convert to deci-
bels or use other transformations?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes. I think we did log-
arithmic and other transformations.
BOB SHELDON: Where were the offices
located?
AL LIEBERMAN: They were located in
Washington in the main Navy building, which
was on Constitution Avenue. I don’t know if
you remember, there were two of them. Two
large buildings connected by bridges. They
were temporary World War I buildings. And
that’s where we worked. It was on Constitution
and Eighteenth or Nineteenth Street. Anyway, I
worked at the Bureau of Ships from ’55 to ’58.
One of the most memorable events that oc-
curred to me during that period of time was the
day my boss said, “Al, I have a job for you this
morning. Sir Ronald Fisher is coming to visit us
and your job for one week is to take care of
him.” I said, “Yes, Ma’am.” She knew Ronald
Fisher very well. So Ronald Fisher arrived and
my job for a week was to take him around
Washington. I took him to various museums
and all that, but there was another major issue.
That was at the time when—I don’t know if you
recall the Suez Canal crisis, when the Israelis,
the French and the Brits took over the Suez
Canal and Eisenhower told them, “Get out of
there and go back.” It had just happened and
Ronald Fisher was so mad at Eisenhower, for
the whole week he complained to me about it.
BOB SHELDON: This is the Fisher we call
R.A. Fisher?
AL LIEBERMAN: R.A. Fisher, that’s the
Fisher, often considered the father of statistics.
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My proudest moment was that when he gave
several lectures, and in one of them I was on the
podium with him. It was Fisher and Lieberman.
He gave a talk and I gave a talk, and some-
where at home I still have the agenda of the two
of us speaking.
BOB SHELDON: What were the topics of
the talks?
AL LIEBERMAN: I remember the topic of
his talk because in those days, Fisher made a
big mistake. He maintained that lung cancer
and smoking were not related.
BOB SHELDON: Was he a smoker?
AL LIEBERMAN: I don’t think so.
BOB SHELDON: And this was in the late
1950’s?
AL LIEBERMAN: It was while I was at the
Bureau of Ships, so it would have been between
’55 and ’58.
BOB SHELDON: Did he have statistical
evidence?
AL LIEBERMAN: Oh, yes. He brought a
lot of it up. It had something to do with the fact
that there were other factors involved. He felt
that people that were prone to lung cancer also
were prone to smoking, something like that. I
should go back home and see if I can find the
program. I think my talk had to deal with se-
quential analysis.
The other interesting thing was about that
time my second daughter was born, so Fisher
announced the birth of my second daughter. So
that was Ronald Fisher.
BOB SHELDON: What audiences was he
speaking to?
AL LIEBERMAN: Statisticians. I don’t re-
member exactly where we were, maybe it was
at the Bureau of Standards or at NIH. He was
here for a little over a week and then he went
on to Australia.
BOB SHELDON: Was his visit sponsored
by the Navy?
AL LIEBERMAN: No, it was not. Some
Australian university hired him to teach there
for a while. On his way from Britain to Austra-
lia, he passed by the United States. He came
here because he knew Bessie Day; he knew a
bunch of people. In 1958 I left the Bureau of
Ships and that brings us to Jack Youden. Jack
Youden was one of the statisticians that worked
at the Bureau of Standards.
BOB SHELDON: Didn’t he work for the
war department during World War II as a stat-
istician?
AL LIEBERMAN: He did. He worked on
the submarine detection problem and stuff like
that during World War II.
BOB SHELDON: Did you work with him
on projects or just meet him?
AL LIEBERMAN: We were together at sta-
tistical lectures. At that time I was deeply in-
volved in the American Statistical Association.
In fact I was on the council for a year. We went
to a lot of meetings and Youden would be there
and he was very friendly with my boss, Bessie
Day. So I got to see him quite often. There were
others in those days, such as John Tukey. I got
to know him. He was a very bright man. There
was also Marvin Zelen, another good statisti-
cian from the Bureau of Standards and of
course, Phil Desind, a very good statistician
who worked at the Navy Department. So I got
to know a lot of statisticians. Then in ’55,
Youden recommended me to the Institute for
Defense Analyses (IDA). IDA was looking for
somebody to do experimental designs. They
were going to run a series of field tests and they
needed an expert in experimental design. Ap-
parently they went to Hugh Miser, who at that
time was head of the Air Force OR group. They
asked Hugh if he could recommend somebody.
Miser asked Youden and Youden recom-
mended me. So I got a call to come over. I went
for an interview and got the job. IDA had about
six or seven people interview me, all of them
were very nice except for one, Koopman.
BOB SHELDON: Bernard Koopman?
AL LIEBERMAN: Bernard Koopman, I’ll
never forget him. Bernard Koopman—I’m sit-
ting in his room waiting for him to come and
interview me. Koopman comes in and said,
“Did you take any math courses?” I said, “Yes”
and I listed 15 to 20 courses that I had taken. He
then asked me, “What about this course?” I
said, “No.” “What about that course?” I said,
“No.” And he went through about ten courses
that I didn’t take. He said, “Well, it looks like
you’re not interested in math at all.” Two
weeks later they offered me a job.
BOB SHELDON: In spite of Bernie Koop-
man.
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes, I was hired in spite
of him. So they offered me a job, and then I
went to work for IDA. I was assigned to a
group that ran a large series of tests on elec-
tronic countermeasures (ECM). I designed the
field tests and did much of the analysis. We also
did computer simulations. The tests were quite
interesting. We did one test with the Navy out
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at sea in a naval task force with air defenses.
The Air Force would then attack the task force
with various levels of ECM. We would evaluate
the effectiveness of the ECM.
[There was] one interesting event that I
remember. The test was set up where the task
force would face the US coast and defend a
90-degree pie sector. We were out at sea one
day, and the combat air patrol aircraft (CAPs)
were out forward to intercept any incoming
aircraft, when all of a sudden coming from
Cuba are a dozen B-47’s. And by that time the
CAPs were way out front. They were running
low on gas and they couldn’t go back to inter-
cept the B-47’s. Well the Navy was really upset
and said, “This test is supposed to be of a
90-degree pie sector in the front.” We had a
meeting where this was discussed. The senior
Air Force Colonel after lunch comes in with a
big box and he opens the box, “To my Navy
friends I give this pie. You can see that a pie is
three hundred and sixty degrees.” And he pre-
sented the pie. Anyway, the Air Force ended up
saying, “Look, we don’t know whose B-47’s
they were, but they’re not ours. We don’t know
who sent them, but it won’t happen again.”
There was a lot of inter-service rivalry, but
still everyone in the end worked together to
improve our forces. Anyway, we ran a number
of these tests, and I remember one that we ran
in the Chicago area. Chicago was the target and
was defended by fighter aircraft and Nike mis-
siles. The bombers would come from Canada
and they would use chaff and ECM while de-
fense was controlled by the SAGE system.
SAGE was a huge complex of IBM computers, I
mean, you can’t believe how many. It was
like—you’d have this whole floor full of com-
puters.
BOB SHELDON: What does SAGE stand
for?
AL LIEBERMAN: It stood for Semi-Auto-
matic Ground Environment. Our tests in Chi-
cago dealt with B-47 aircraft, using a variety of
ECM techniques, penetrating at various alti-
tudes. Fighter aircraft and Nike missiles de-
fended the Chicago area. Well General LeMay
was the Air Force Chief of Staff at the time, and
he wanted the Air Force to win no matter what.
So one day in the middle of the night, we had
those B-47’s come in over Chicago at about one
hundred and fifty feet. We had numerous com-
plaints about the noise these aircraft made over
the city. In addition, they dropped so much
chaff over Canada that they shorted power
lines. Furthermore, a number of cows got sick
from eating the chaff. Anyway, we ran these
tests and they helped in improving both our
electronic countermeasures as well as our de-
fensive systems.
BOB SHELDON: Was IDA doing this for
one of the services?
AL LIEBERMAN: IDA was doing this for
the JCS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We had two
bosses, JCS and DDR&E; Harold Brown headed
DDR&E at that time.
BOB SHELDON: What year were you do-
ing these studies?
AL LIEBERMAN: At IDA, I worked there
from February of ’58 to October of ’63, so it was
sometime in that period.
BOB SHELDON: Was there an impetus for
these studies from the Cuban missile crisis?
AL LIEBERMAN: The impetus for these
tests was to see how our air defense systems
would work in an ECM environment in defend-
ing against penetrating Soviet bombers. At the
same time, we also examined what the impact
of jamming and the use of chaff was on the
capability of our bombers in penetrating the
Soviet Union.
BOB SHELDON: Did we try to mimic the
Soviet radar capabilities or did we just use our
own?
AL LIEBERMAN: We used our own ra-
dars. After this series of field tests, we built a
simulation model. The model had two major
components: one was a simulation of intercep-
tor fighters, and the other was of surface to air
missiles. We would take some of the data that
we got from the tests to calibrate the model. We
then used the model to examine a number of
other situations.
BOB SHELDON: What types of variables
did you play around with? Was radar cross-
section a factor?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes, radar cross-section
was a factor, jamming was a factor, and the use
of chaff, the altitude of the bombers. They
mostly came in very low. I remember one case
where one fighter locked onto a boat on Lake
Michigan. So those were my years at IDA until
sometime in October of ’63. At that time there
was a fellow at the Arms Control & Disarma-
ment Agency (ACDA) by the name of Les
Kahn. He was running a joint project between
ACDA and the Department of Defense called
Project Cloud Gap. Project Cloud Gap dealt
with the field-testing of on-site inspection tech-
niques for inspecting arms control agreements.
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He was looking for someone with experience in
field test design and analysis. So since he had
been working at IDA in the past, he went to
IDA to find out if someone was there, and they
pointed him to me. He talked to me and he
asked me what did I think about working with
him. I told him that I would be interested. So
the next thing that happened was a letter from
the Director of the Arms Control Agency, at the
time William Foster, to McNamara, who was
Secretary of Defense, saying they would like to
borrow Al Lieberman who works at IDA to
help them out with some of these tests. Mc-
Namara sent the request to IDA and asked if
we could do this? And, of course, coming from
McNamara, they said, “Sure.” So I was on loan
to ACDA for six months.
BOB SHELDON: Where was ACDA lo-
cated?
AL LIEBERMAN: ACDA was located in
the State Department Building. Project Cloud
Gap, however, was at that time in offices right
next to the White House. It was in one of those
little buildings by Lafayette Square. It was be-
fore they put up the large building that is now
there. In fact, my office looked into the bed-
room of the Blair House. So I was put on loan to
ACDA and worked on Project Cloud Gap.
There were a number of other civilians working
there as well as military officers. We started
designing some field tests dealing with on-site
inspection of Soviet military facilities. Of course
in those days, everybody thought that was a
pipe dream to think that the Soviet Union
would let us inspect their facilities. But never-
theless, the decision was made to do some ex-
periments. It was interesting work. There were
many bureaucratic problems, however. Project
Cloud Gap was responsible to a review board
which set policy and approved our test. The
review board was composed of a representative
from ACDA, the Defense Department, the State
Department, CIA, and the Atomic Energy Com-
mission. They each had a senior representative.
We would brief this board as to what our plans
were and they would have lengthy debates on
each of our proposals. Eventually we’d get ap-
proval and we started running, first small ex-
periments, and then larger ones.
BOB SHELDON: What did you experi-
ment on? Live atomic explosions?
AL LIEBERMAN: Oh, no. We did on-site
inspections. For example, we had an experi-
ment to determine the type of inspection that
would be required to determine the military
equipment at an Army base. What we did was
to put together a group of inspection teams of
various sizes—mostly military officers—to
count how many tanks were at Fort Hood in
Texas. We had various size teams, some of two
inspectors, some of four, and so on. The teams
had varying degree of access. Some could only
go by certain areas of the place to look, others
could go in deeper. Some had equipment with
them, like cameras, seismographs and other
equipment. So the variables were various de-
grees of penetration, various type of equip-
ment, various sizes of teams. Of course, we also
collected the “ground truth” against which we
could compare the results of the test.
BOB SHELDON: Were these classified se-
cret?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes. Classified secret,
but some of them are unclassified now. We also
ran a whole series dealing with nuclear weap-
ons. One of them dealt with a proposal made by
President Eisenhower. Under this proposal, we
stated that we would get rid of fifty thousand
kilograms of weapons grade uranium if the
Soviets would get rid of thirty thousand kilo-
grams. The Soviets said, “Well, that’s just pro-
paganda because you’ll just produce additional
uranium and it would have no impact on our
weapons program.” We replied by stating that
we would actually take the nuclear material out
of some of our weapons systems. And in order
to verify this fact, we would have on-site in-
spections. We ran a test to see how such an
inspection would be performed. Keep in mind
that we are dealing with highly classified ma-
terial, and we had to set up an inspection
scheme which could do this verification with-
out compromising security. We again set up
various inspection teams, various amounts of
penetration. The essence of the inspection plan
was that the weapons would be dismantled
inside a sealed laboratory. The inspectors
would inspect the lab before the weapon en-
tered the lab to make sure that no nuclear ma-
terial was stored there. The inspectors would
then be posted at the entrance of the building,
and they would observe the weapon being
brought into the building. The inspectors
would look at it and be able to check on certain
parts of it and in some cases make measure-
ments (such as Geiger counters). No inspector
could go inside the laboratory while the
weapon was being taken apart. Then it would
come out in pieces and we would have inspec-
tors look at these pieces and see that indeed,
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT. . .ALFRED LIEBERMAN, FS
Page 66 Military Operations Research, V9 N1 2004
that nuclear material came from the nuclear
weapon.
BOB SHELDON: Was that test also at Fort
Hood?
AL LIEBERMAN: No, Fort Hood was the
test to count the tanks. This test was at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory. We had another
test of conventional forces at Fort Lewis in the
state of Washington. Our biggest test was run
in the U.K. We had a group of British officers
working with us. The purpose of the test was to
inspect all the military installations in a part of
Great Britain. The British military were the ob-
ject of inspection and American military were
the arms control inspectors. This was a joint test
with Great Britain, and the British appointed a
brigadier to be test director, and one of the
fellows working for me was appointed techni-
cal director. This field test ran over a period of
six months. It was a very interesting and useful
test. The British brigadier was very good and
quite a showman. He invited people from
NATO who came to view the test. He also
invited the Russians as well as some of the
Eastern Europeans, but none of them showed
up. However, we got a good deal of publicity.
BOB SHELDON: What kind of variables
did you exercise on that test?
AL LIEBERMAN: Team size was one vari-
able. The degree of access was another—some
of the inspectors were just outside the camps
and had to keep track of things from there,
others could actually go in and count things.
Equipment was another factor—some inspec-
tors could use cameras, some were able to in-
stall unattended seismometers as well as other
equipment. The test area was very large and
required substantial travel by the inspectors.
And finally, the area was overflown by a U2
aircraft. I didn’t know about these overflights
when we started the test. I did not have the
necessary clearance for the U2 program. I did
get that clearance after the test for the analysis.
When we designed the test, however, we did
not include the U2 overflights into the test de-
sign. Also noteworthy was the fact that we had
an agreement with the British that no U2 air-
craft would overfly Great Britain. A special
waiver was worked out for this test with British
officials, since it was a joint program with the
U.K.
BOB SHELDON: Studying all these vari-
ables, you must have an appreciation for how
difficult it is to find WMD in Iraq?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes, it can be very diffi-
cult, very difficult. But, of course, we were
looking at conventional forces that we were
trying to count.
BOB SHELDON: Tanks?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes, and estimates of
personnel manpower, keeping track of helicop-
ters and military aircraft, as well as other mili-
tary equipment. They were all fairly large
pieces of equipment, and manpower. And, of
course, one of the big things in all these tests
was to generate the “ground truth,” that is,
what really is in the area. We found that no-
body really knew exactly how many tanks and
other pieces of equipment they really had. We
found that at Fort Hood and again here.
BOB SHELDON: Whom did you report to
when the test was done?
AL LIEBERMAN: We reported to our re-
view board, the reports went to ACDA, De-
fense, CIA, State and the AEC. A report also
went to the U.K. The results were preparations,
so if we ever reached some agreement on on-
site inspections, these tests produced some
guideline as to what kind of on-site inspection
we should have.
BOB SHELDON: Did you run any other
kind of test?
AL LIEBERMAN: We also ran a test on the
detection of underground nuclear detonations
for the test ban treaty. We ran that in Nevada.
We had teams planting various evidence of
underground nuclear tests in some hidden ar-
eas in the desert. We had various inspection
teams driving around, trying to look for the
evidence. The inspectors covered large areas in
the Nevada desert. Again the variables were
team size and equipment availability. We con-
ducted all these tests, and we did have some
guidelines for when the time came when agree-
ment was reached on on-site inspections. Even-
tually, the time did come and I think that some
of our findings were useful.
BOB SHELDON: Did they share that with
the U.N. too?
AL LIEBERMAN: We did not share with
the U.N. at the time. Now later on, we may
have. I know when the test reports were first
written, they were classified. We also, in many
cases, had an unclassified version of some of
these tests. But the results did go to all the
government agencies that were involved in the
arms control process.
BOB SHELDON: What happened to
Project Cloud Gap?
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AL LIEBERMAN: The project lasted for a
number of years and somewhere along the line
the project was abolished because of two fac-
tors: 1) It was a pretty expensive project. It was
jointly funded by ACDA and the Defense De-
partment, and each of them put in three or four
million dollars every year; and 2) There was a
feeling that we would never get agreement
from the Soviet Union for on-site inspection. So
it was disbanded, but the Arms Control Agency
then transformed its part of the contribution to
what we called the Field Office. We continued
running tests, but it was no longer with the
Defense Department. We mostly ran a lot of
simulations and stuff like that. And then even-
tually that office was abolished all together.
Then we were put into the Operations Analysis
Office, which was just being created.
BOB SHELDON: How large was that?
AL LIEBERMAN: At the beginning it was
very small, and then I took it over and I built it
up to about twenty-three, of which about five
or six were military officers. In the early days, I
had at least one from each service, one Army,
one Navy, one Air Force, sometimes more than
that. I had some very good people working for
me.
BOB SHELDON: What kind of issues did
you tackle?
AL LIEBERMAN: We had a large model of
a nuclear exchange which we used to examine
various arms control agreements to determine
whether or not certain provisions were advan-
tageous to the U.S. And we looked at nuclear
exchanges and we looked at strategic force re-
ductions of various kinds. We calculated results
showing how various arms limitation provi-
sions would affect us. We finished these reports
and those reports helped formulate the position
of the Arms Control Agency on a number of
issues. One of the key issues was whether or
not we should abolish the MIRVing of ballistic
missiles. We did several studies on whether it
would be advantageous to the U.S. This issue
was one of the big questions, and that was
before us. The problem was that at the time we
were way ahead of the Russians in MIRV tech-
nology.
Some of our studies warned that they had
larger missiles and some day might load more
MIRVs on them than we had. We also showed
that MIRVs created a destabilizing situation
since one attacking missile could destroy sev-
eral missiles silos. It was however not possible
at that time to convince the inter-agency that
MIRVs should be limited because we were so
far ahead of the Soviets. In the end the Soviets
caught up and loaded many more MIRVs on
their missiles than we did on ours. It was not a
smart decision to forgo MIRV limits, but maybe
it couldn’t be helped.
BOB SHELDON: What other strategic
studies did you do?
AL LIEBERMAN: We did many studies on
the survivability of ICBMs. We calculated the
survivability of the Minuteman silos to a vari-
ety of attacks from the Soviet Union. We per-
formed many studies on strategic stability.
These were essentially examinations of the ad-
vantage of a first strike and to see how such
advantages could be minimized or eliminated.
Numerous studies were performed on a variety
of ICBM deployments. We examined mobile
missiles, very deep silos, digging out moun-
tains for ICBM deployment etc. We also did a
very large study of civil defense. Did you ever
hear of T.K. Jones?
BOB SHELDON: No.
AL LIEBERMAN: T.K. Jones worked for
Boeing, and then he got a job with the Defense
Department and he came out with statements
that the Russians had built such a great civil
defense system that they could withstand nu-
clear war while we could do nothing. So we did
a very large study which showed that the Rus-
sian’s civil defense would not save them from
disaster in a nuclear war.
BOB SHELDON: Did you get your data
from the CIA or other folks?
AL LIEBERMAN: We got some data from
the CIA; we also got a lot of data from the
Defense Department and the Services. But the
essence was that we ran our nuclear exchange
model with many variables and showed what
would occur under a variety of different con-
ditions. Our studies showed what disasters
would occur in case of nuclear war even with
the most sophisticated civil defense. We did the
civil defense study, and that study became very
important because I testified at some congres-
sional hearings about the results of our study.
The results were clear that while a good civil
defense program was useful, it in no way un-
dermined our deterrence capabilities. The
study showed that our offensive forces would
create horrendous damage against even the
most advanced civil defense program. Senator
Ted Kennedy put an unclassified version of our
study into the congressional record.
BOB SHELDON: What year was that?
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AL LIEBERMAN: It must have been in the
Seventies.
BOB SHELDON: What kinds of questions
did they ask you as an expert witness?
AL LIEBERMAN: Essentially, the question
with Soviet Civil Defense System and the issue
was, “Do we need to build a big civil defense
system in the U.S.?” “Did we need to add more
to our offensive capability to offset the Soviet
civil defense?” “Are we really at a disadvantage
because of the Soviet civil defense program?”
As well as other issues related to civil defense.
We had many discussions at MORS on the So-
viet civil defense program. It went on for sev-
eral symposia and was hotly debated.
BOB SHELDON: How were your answers
received by the Senators?
AL LIEBERMAN: They were received very
well, in particular by Senator John Warner from
Virginia. He was worried about it. Defense was
coming up with a proposal where we had a big
civil defense program and we would evacuate
cities like Washington. The people would go
out in the countryside with no clear plan as to
what would be done next. In general, our study
illustrated what would really happen in a major
nuclear war. Not just the human casualties but
also the massive destruction of the infrastruc-
ture of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
BOB SHELDON: Did you do any other
studies related to the effects of nuclear war?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes, we published a se-
ries of maps of just about every city in the
United States and many cities in Europe and in
the Soviet Union showing what would happen
to the city if weapons of various sizes were
dropped on it. We calculated fatalities and
other damages that would come from radia-
tion, fallout and other nuclear effects. We must
have mailed out thousands of those maps to
people who requested them. I don’t know how
they found out but some publications noted
that we had these maps. We mailed out these
maps all over the place showing the danger of
nuclear war and what would happen. We had
maps of the United States showing how a major
Soviet attack would create fallout over most of
the country. These maps would show fallout all
over the U.S. Here and there, however, there
would be some small area where the maps
indicated that there was little or no fallout. So
I’d get phone calls asking me if these were safe
areas. I got calls from a bank out west. They
said, “We want to bury our records in some
place that is safe. Tell us where the safest place
is so we can dig down there and bury our
records underground, so if there is a nuclear
war, we can recover our records later.” I told
them, “Look, these are simulations and fallout
varies depending on winds and other factors.
You can’t find safe areas from these maps. The
best I can tell you is to stay away from big
military installations.”
BOB SHELDON: What other nuclear stud-
ies did you do?
AL LIEBERMAN: We did a lot of work
related to the detection and identification of
underground nuclear tests. This work was in
support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
and Limited Test Ban Treaty. These studies
dealt mostly with seismic detection and statis-
tical analysis to determine our capability in de-
tecting underground nuclear tests at various
locations and using various seismic networks
as well as other means. One of the key prob-
lems was to distinguish between earthquakes
and explosions. Another problem was to exam-
ine detection capability against potential eva-
sion techniques. On the Limited Test Ban
Treaty that prohibited testing over a hundred
and fifty kilotons, our studies dealt with our
capability to determine that the hundred and
fifty-kiloton threshold was not exceeded.
BOB SHELDON: Did they study things
like that by doing live tests or by simulations?
AL LIEBERMAN: I think the Atomic En-
ergy Commission ran a few tests in which they
decoupled the explosive from the ground by
putting it in a large cavity. A number of tests
were also run on softer material, such as allu-
vium, which tended to muffle the seismic sig-
nal. We also spent a good deal of time on some
of the Soviet capabilities in evading our detec-
tion. The Soviet Union has a number of areas
with large salt mines where they could test.
BOB SHELDON: Did they do tests on a
smaller scale and then scale up the results?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes, we did that too.
BOB SHELDON: Scalability is always a
problem. Did you have statistical ways of ad-
dressing that?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes there’s pretty good
data on the weapons effect of a nuclear weapon
and how to relate smaller ones to larger ones.
We also did some work on chemical and bio-
logical weapons, on verifying compliance and
destruction of chemical weapons. I mean, we
can’t inspect every chemical weapon, but we
developed sampling plans to assure that de-
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struction of chemical weapons was done as
specified by treaty.
BOB SHELDON: What about the reduc-
tion of strategic forces?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes. We did some work
on the verification of the destruction of missile
systems. There is a treaty which eliminates in-
termediate range ballistic missiles. On the So-
viet side this meant the elimination of the SS-20
IRBM. The SS-20 was produced at a facility in
Votkinsk. The Soviets also produce other mis-
siles at this facility. In order to assure that they
would not produce any more SS-20s, we had an
inspection team at the exit from this facility.
The missiles would leave the facility on railroad
cars. We had a big machine that X-rayed the
railcars that came out and we would then try to
ensure that the missiles were not the banned
SS-20s. We built a computer model to analyze
this data and give us assurance that the missiles
were indeed not the SS-20s.
There were so many different things that
we did. Matter of fact, during the heydays of
our operations analysis office, we put out al-
most two reports a week. We had more than
twenty people in our shop. So we put out
roughly two papers a week dealing with all
kinds of issues. Now some of them were just
minor issues, like specific provisions of certain
proposed treaties. Others were major studies
that required complex models and substantial
analysis.
BOB SHELDON: Were there any other fa-
mous analysts that worked for you at that time?
AL LIEBERMAN: We had a number of
very good analysts. Jim Hartzler who came
from CNA and Glen Johnson. Glen Johnson
was a MORS Director at one time. Carl Thorne
was and still is a very good analyst. He came to
our group as a military officer, and then he
retired and I hired him. Later he went to work
for the Atomic Energy Commission. He at-
tended many MORS symposia. Of course, Walt
Deemer, FS [former Deputy Assistant Director,
ACDA] was a consultant for years. He was a
consultant until the age of 81 or 82. I’m trying to
beat his record.
BOB SHELDON: What kind of skills did
you look for in the people you hired for your
operations analysis group?
AL LIEBERMAN: I looked for a mix. We
had experts in mathematics, physics, and sta-
tistics primarily, but then I looked for some
people that were just bright and good at anal-
ysis. I think we had a pretty good mix.
BOB SHELDON: Did you look for military
experience?
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes. For one thing, we
had some standard military officers so I always
requested operations analysts that had either
attended the Naval Postgraduate School or any
of the other military schools. I usually asked for
someone who had a background in operations
research and the services usually supplied very
good people. I also tried to get people that
worked in Air Force Studies and Analyses. I
tried to get people that had worked for General
Glenn Kent when he headed Studies and Anal-
yses. After he retired Glenn Kent went to work
for rand and we had a series of round table
discussions where he kept us honest. I did a
little work with Greg Parnell, FS. When he was
at Air Force Studies and Analyses, some of the
analysts working for him did an interesting
study on the value of ICBM reduction.
BOB SHELDON: Were you a member of
the American Statistical Association when you
were working nuclear issues?
AL LIEBERMAN: No—I did give a couple
of talks at the American Statistical Association a
long time ago and I don’t recall if they included
these tests. But at that time, I was already at
IDA where I kind of switched from statistics to
operations research even though I worked on
statistical problems. This was in the late 50’s. I
was at IDA between ’58 and ’63. So I was al-
ready getting more interested in OR.
BOB SHELDON: Before MORS was a so-
ciety?
AL LIEBERMAN: There were some meet-
ings on the West Coast as early as 1957. In 1962
the first national symposium occurred but
MORS did not become an organized society
until 1966.
BOB SHELDON: What was the first MORS
function you attended?
AL LIEBERMAN: I can’t be exactly sure
which was the first symposium that I attended.
I know I went to at least one or two while I was
working at IDA.
BOB SHELDON: Who recruited you to
MORS?
AL LIEBERMAN: A number of people
from IDA went to the MORS symposia. Even-
tually I asked to go and went with them. I really
started attending MORS meetings once I was
working at ACDA, the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. It was created in 1961
and it ended in 1997 or ’98, at which time it was
incorporated into the Department of State.
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From 1961 to 1998 it was an independent
agency and my whole analytic career was spent
there. While I was working there I started get-
ting much more interested in MORS. I was
particularly interested in arms control and the
strategic working groups. After attending a
number of meetings I was anxious to become a
member of the Board of Directors. I felt that
there should be one director representing the
arms control area. One of my consultants as
well as a good friend was Walt Deemer, FS.
Deemer had been a President of MORS. He told
me to talk to Clay Thomas, FS. Deemer and
Thomas had worked together for years in the
Air Force Studies and Analyses shop. So I went
and talked to Clay at one of the MORS meetings
and I told him, “I’m interested in representing
the arms control community on the Board.” I
told him that there were quite a few MORS
members interested in arms control. He told me
that in order to get on the Board I had to do
some work and make some contributions to
MORS. So I started presenting papers. I don’t
recall the first paper I gave but I know defi-
nitely that I attended the 33rd MORS in 1973
and presented a paper. At the 35th MORS, I
organized and became chair of the Arms Con-
trol Working Group. Most of the members of
this group came from the Strategic Working
Group, which at that time was very large. At
the 39th MORS, I became Working Group Co-
ordinator.
BOB SHELDON: As a working group
chair, where did you look for people to present
papers?
AL LIEBERMAN: I looked first of all at the
various government agencies working in the
arms control field. I got some of people from
the Services, the Department of Energy, the
CIA. There were also a number of contractors
working in the arms control area and I re-
cruited some of them. So we had quite a large
arms control group at that time. We had some
very interesting meetings, big battles going on,
because arms control was and still is a very
sensitive area. There’s much opposition, and at
MORS, it was reflected in our discussions. We
had tremendous arguments going on, but it
was exciting and interesting and I could always
get an argument going. At the 39th MORS in
1977 I became Working Group coordinator. At
that MORS, I was also elected to the Board of
Directors. At the 41st MORS, I gave a special
topic presentation entitled “Is the Strategic
Triad Necessary.” At the 42nd MORS, I was
Program Chairman. Then while I was on the
Board, I was Vice President for Symposium
Operations and was in charge of the committee
that formulated guidance for the establishment
and disestablishment of working groups.
MORS needed a process to create new working
groups and to disestablish such groups when
the attendance was too low. We also estab-
lished the Working Group Advisory Commit-
tee; no such committee existed until then. I
became the advisor to the Arms Control Work-
ing Group. Then in ’80 and ’81, I was Vice
President of Professional Affairs. And I ran to
be President of MORS, but I was defeated by
Amie Hoeber.
BOB SHELDON: During your year as VP
for Professional Affairs, did anything signifi-
cant happen?
AL LIEBERMAN: I wrote a staff paper on
the value of having two MORS meetings each
year. But I don’t know if it was then; I was on
the Board twice and I don’t know if it was then
or later that some of the services objected to
having two meetings per year. My paper tried
to justify two meetings. The decision however
was made to have only one per year. I don’t
know whatever happened to that paper, and
exactly when I wrote it since I was on the Board
a second time from ’88 to ’92.
BOB SHELDON: We refer to directors
who serve more than one term as retreads? Did
they use that expression?
AL LIEBERMAN: Retreads, that’s correct. I
was a retread. That is true.
BOB SHELDON: What motivated you to
join the Board again?
AL LIEBERMAN: I don’t remember who
nominated me. I think that one of the things I
had done that people liked when I was on the
Board was that I brought people that had never
been on the Board before and many of them
had only barely gone to MORS. I brought in
people from CIA, the Department of Energy,
and a number of our contractors and of course
staff members from ACDA. Some of these peo-
ple made valuable contributions to MORS:
Derk Swain, Sydell Gold and Hank Cooper. In
my second term, I made a major contribution. I
was chair of the Membership Committee and
we established [the current rules for] MORS
membership. Before that they didn’t exist; there
were no MORS members except for the Direc-
tors. We established the scheme of having Di-
rectors, Fellows and Members.
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BOB SHELDON: How come they decided
on the three running years of membership?
AL LIEBERMAN: I’m not clear exactly
how we decided, but it was clear that we didn’t
want people to be on it forever. I think we came
up with it, because somebody might miss one
or even two meetings. But if you miss three in
a row, then you’re off the membership. I think
that’s kind of the way it was done.
The other major issue was whether or not
we should charge a fee for membership. We
decided against that. The reason was if you’re
paying twenty-five dollars a year and then you
change jobs and lose your security clearance,
now we can’t invite you to the MORS sympo-
sium and you might argue, “Well, wait a
minute, I’m paying my dues. How can you
deprive me from going to the symposium?” To
avoid that problem, we decided that there
would be no dues.
BOB SHELDON: That was quite a contri-
bution to the Society.
AL LIEBERMAN: Yes. I always felt that
was one of the most valuable contributions I
made to MORS—the creation of membership.
BOB SHELDON: How was the decision on
the fellowship made?
AL LIEBERMAN: I don’t know who sug-
gested it or exactly where it came from, but
someone suggested other societies had fellows;
we should have Fellows at MORS. There was
the need of recognition for some of the old
timers. There was some discussion about how
they should be selected and we looked at what
some other societies did. We collected informa-
tion from other societies, how they set up fel-
lowships and eventually we came up with our
Fellow’s procedure. We established two basic
rules for the selection of Fellows: A) we should
not have too many Fellows—I think the maxi-
mum number of five new Fellows per year;
and: B) that we would also in the early days
have a special provision to pick up some of the
old timers that were no longer attending MORS
until we caught up and include those that had
made contributions to the Society. So then we
presented our results to the Board, and the
Board voted to accept our proposal. A plan was
then formulated to select our first group of
Fellows, and the first five Fellows were se-
lected. That was the beginning. And later, they
added the fact that retired Fellows can attend
the symposium without paying the registration
fee.
One more contribution I made to MORS, I
wrote chapter 10 of the MORS publication Mil-
itary Modeling for Decision Making, edited by
Wayne Hughes, FS.
BOB SHELDON: Did you write that solo?
AL LIEBERMAN: I had other people con-
tribute. I wrote most of it, but there’s one sec-
tion that I don’t know anything about; that
section dealt with urban warfare. I didn’t know
anything about urban warfare. Wayne asked
someone to write that part. I also got some help
on the Soviet costing issue. But I wrote every-
thing else.
BOB SHELDON: Since you saw MORS
over the course of several of years, what’s your
impression of how MORS evolved?
AL LIEBERMAN: I have always liked
MORS and I think it has evolved very well. My
primary areas of interest were arms control and
strategic analysis. Those were the two fields I
generally concentrated on. And I would say
recently, there is less work in those areas than
there was in the past. This is principally due to
the fact that we are no longer facing the Soviet
Union as an adversary. There are new problems
today but they are very different and appear
much more complicated. With the Soviet
Union, we had a rational adversary. Now, who
the heck is the adversary? Certainly, there’s no
rational one. So how do you set up an analysis
against people when we really don’t even know
who they are? I am sure that in due time we
will develop analytical procedures to attack
these new problems and MORS will be in the
forefront of these developments.
North Korea is a very dangerous situation.
We are dealing with a dictatorship of a country
that is in dire need of help with people close to
starvation and at the same time maintaining a
very large armed force. Perhaps some analyti-
cal procedures can be developed to examine
this situation. But it will require the inclusion of
political and psychological issues as well as
military. Then there is the issue of terrorism.
What do you do about guys that would come
and blow themselves up in your face? How are
you going to deter them? With what are you
going to deter them? And who are they? And
why are they doing it? We don’t know the
answer to many of those questions.
I mean, you can understand the Palestin-
ians and you can understand the Chechens a
little bit, but who understands al Qaeda? Any-
way, that’s been one of the problems, defining
the enemy and finding his purpose, and then
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figuring out what to do about it. I think we
have a problem right now and from an opera-
tions analysis point of view—how does one
study this problem? It’s a hard problem to
study because it is so hard to define what the
problem is.
BOB SHELDON: In closing, what advice
would you give to young MORS directors,
since you served two terms on the Board?
AL LIEBERMAN: A lot of thought should
be given to keeping MORS—and by that I mean
not just MORS, but operations analysis in gen-
eral—pertinent to the problems of the day. That
goes back again to what I mentioned earlier
about who’s the enemy. Military operations re-
search is set up to study problems as to how the
military should operate and keep us going,
keep the United States strong and safe. The real
problem is to figure out what the problem is,
and that’s not easy right now. Another issue for
Directors is to make sure that they keep a bal-
ance on the Board, to keep the government
involved, keep contractors involved and to
spread it among the various government agen-
cies. Defense, of course, is the principal one, but
keep the nuclear people involved and keep the
CIA involved and keep the State Department
involved. Homeland Security now is another
one that should have some involvement. And
so keep a balance on the Board.
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